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Contributions to Children by Divorced 
Fathers* 
JAY D. TEACHMAN, University of Maryland 
Beyond the payment of child support, relatively little is known about he nature and extent of contributions 
of divorced fathers to their children. Using nationally representative data from a sample of ever-divorced women 
taken from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, the nature and extent of various 
forms of assistance (in eight areas) provided by divorced fathers are examined. The majority offathers seldom or 
never make contributions to their children. Fathers who do contribute to their children have more economic 
resources and enjoy better relationships with the custodial mother. In addition, there is little support for the 
notion that fathers substitute other forms of assistance for payment of child support. Rather, other forms of 
support are provided in addition to making child-support payments. 
Concern over the consequences of marital disruption has spurred considerable research, 
documenting the negative consequences of marital dissolution for female-headed families 
(Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986; Hoffman and Duncan 1988) and the long-term negative con- 
sequences for children (McLanahan and Bumpass 1988). At least part of the negative impact 
of divorce on women and children can be traced to the loss of economic support from fathers. 
Specifically, women with children experience a 30 percent decline in income in the first year 
following divorce (Hoffman and Duncan 1988), and divorce accounts for many women falling 
below the poverty line (Lerman 1987). 
Historically, as it has evolved through the political and legal systems (Kahn and 
Kamerman 1988), the central mechanism by which divorced fathers contribute to their chil- 
dren has been court-ordered child-support payments. Yet, recent estimates indicate that 
nearly 20 percent of divorced mothers do not have a child-support award (Office of Child 
Support Enforcement 1988). Moreover, of women with an award, less than 75 percent re- 
ceive payment, and the amount of support received is generally below the costs associated 
with rearing children (Beller and Graham 1985; Seltzer 1991). Recognizing the centrality of 
child-support payments for the economic well being of children following divorce and the 
variability in child-support outcomes, considerable research has sought to identify the corre- 
lates of child-support award and receipt, as well as the amounts involved (Beller and Graham 
1985, 1986; Hill 1984; O'Neill 1985; Peterson and Nord 1988; Seltzer and Garfinkel 1990). 
However, almost nothing is known about other forms of social and economic contribu- 
tions fathers make to their children. In addition to making child-support payments, fathers 
can provide economic contributions by purchasing clothing for their children or by assuming 
medical and other expenses, resulting in increased material well being of their children. Such 
economic contributions also imply greater involvement on the part of fathers as they gather 
information about their children (likely through increased contact) and make decisions about 
how much to contribute, when to contribute, and in which areas. 
Fathers can also elect to participate more or less fully in their children's daily activities, 
for example, taking an active interest in their children's schooling. Although the roots of the 
* This research was supported by funds provided by the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of 
Wisconsin, NSF grant SES-8812215, and a Semester Research Award from the University of Maryland. Research 
conducted at the Center on Population, Gender, and Social Inequality is facilitated by a grant from the William and Flora 
Hewlett Foundation. Correspondence to: Teachman, Center on Population, Gender, and Social Inequality and 
Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1315. 
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effects are not entirely clear, children from divorced families are more likely to drop out of 
high school, experience disciplinary problems in school, and engage in delinquent behavior 
(Hetherington, Cox, and Cox 1979; Matsueda and Heimer 1987; McLanahan 1985). These out- 
comes may be due partly to the lack of participation and supervision on the part of fathers. 
Given the paucity of empirical evidence, the first goal of this paper is to describe the 
nature and extent of contributions fathers make to their children, including child-support 
payments, but with greater emphasis on other forms of assistance. The second goal is to esti- 
mate the relationship between selected variables and these contributions. 
The third goal is to ascertain the degree to which fathers who provide one form of assist- 
ance are likely to provide other forms, with particular attention to competing hyphotheses 
about the association between child-support payments and other contributions. One hypothe- 
sis holds that contributions are positively correlated because divorced fathers who pay child 
support are more likely to have contact with their children (Furstenberg et al. 1983; Seltzer, 
Schaeffer, and Charng 1989). Fathers who have contact with their children have both the 
information and opportunity needed to provide other forms of assistance. 
The alternative hypothesis holds that fathers opt to substitute, not supplement, other 
forms of assistance for child-support payments. This occurs because fathers cannot control 
how the payments are divided between the personal consumption of the custodial parent and 
the children (Weiss and Willis 1985). Congruent with reports from divorced fathers, inability 
to control how child support is allocated by the custodial mother might be a primary reason 
for not making payments (Haskins 1988). By examining the relationship between child-sup- 
port payments and other forms of assistance, it is possible to test whether they are substitutes 
or complements. 
Data 
The data are taken from the fifth round of the National Longitudinal Study of the High 
School Class of 1972 (NLS). The NLS has followed respondents from their senior year in high 
school to early 1986, with intervening follow-ups in 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1979. The original 
sample was a stratified random sample of all high-school seniors enrolled in public, private, 
and church-affiliated high schools in the United States (Tourangeau et al. 1987). The fifth 
follow-up is a subsample of approximately 14,500 cases of the original sample of over 22,000 
men and women and contains a supplement gathering detailed information from ever-mar- 
ried custodial parents about the nature and extent of assistance provided by the other parent. 
Because very few divorced fathers in the population and thus in the NLS data have custody of 
their children, analyses are based on responses provided by mothers. 
Respondents in the NLS are followed from approximately age 18 to age 32, a span of ages 
over which both marriage and divorce are likely to occur. However, disruptions of late mar- 
riages (those that occur after age 32) and marriages of long duration (more than 14 years) are 
not observed. Also, women divorced after age 32 are not included. However, the ages cov- 
ered in the NLS are those at which parents are likely to have minor children. All divorced 
mothers in the NLS are included in the analysis, yielding a sample size of 644. 
To determine the nature and extent of assistance provided by fathers, mothers were 
asked how regularly the spouse provided assistance with: clothes, gifts, vacations, dental care, 
medical insurance, uninsured medical expenses, help with homework, and attending school 
events. They also were asked to report on child support payments. 
The use of reports from one spouse (the mother) introduces downward bias into the data. 
Mothers may underestimate the contributions fathers make to their children for at least two 
reasons: (1) they lack information about the contributions, or (2) they deliberately downplay 
the contributions. The first source of bias is likely to be random across mothers, leading to 
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conservative estimates of the contributions fathers make but not affecting differences accord- 
ing to the predictor variables. 
The second source of bias is more problematic because it is more likely that mothers will 
downplay the contributions of fathers if their relationship is poor. This type of bias would, 
therefore, artificially increase reported differences in contributions according to measures of 
the relationship between the parents. Unfortunately, the data available do not provide any 
other assessment of the contributions made by fathers. Thus, reported differences according 
to parental relationship should be interpreted cautiously. 
The NLS also misses individuals who were not in school the spring of their senior year in 
high school. Variation in education and in other variables is thus truncated. However, this 
restriction is likely to have less impact on ever-divorced mothers because they are more likely 
than never-married mothers to have graduated from high school. In general, though, the 
higher education of the NLS sample compared to the United States population means that 
fathers are more likely to have the resources needed to provide various forms of assistance, 
most likely leading to an upward bias in the results reported below. 
Descriptive Results 
Responses for the regularity with which each type of assistance is provided by fathers are 
shown in Table 1. Excluding child support, the results indicate that fathers seldom provide 
Table 1 * Regularity with which Fathers Provide Each Form of Assistance (percent) (N = 644) 
Very Regularly to Never 
Form of Assistance 1 2 3 4 5 
Pays for clothes 5 3 12 15 65 
Pays for presents 13 8 20 19 40 
Takes the children on vacation 8 4 11 11 65 
Pays for routine dental care 13 3 5 5 75 
Carries medical insurance 28 3 5 4 61 
Pays for uninsured medical expenses 12 3 6 4 76 
Helps the children with homework 2 2 5 6 85 
Attends school events 4 3 7 12 75 
Regularly Occasionally Seldom Never 
Regularity of Child Support Payments 43 11 18 28 
any given assistance. For only one item, purchasing gifts, have more than 50 percent of the 
fathers ever provided assistance. Except for the provision of medical insurance, which is 
likely to be included in divorce settlements, fewer than one out of seven fathers provides 
assistance on a very regular basis. Results based on a different scale indicate that more fathers 
have at some time paid child support (almost three out of four) than have at some time pro- 
vided any of the other forms of assistance.' 
Fathers are somewhat more likely to provide economic assistance than non-economic 
assistance. The proportion of fathers who participate in the schooling of their children is 
1. Originally, two measures of receipt of child support were considered: whether support was received in the past 
month and the regularity with which support is received. Each indicator is subject to different sorts of response error. 
While the indicator of whether support was received in the last month is likely to suffer from recall bias, the indicator of 
the regularity of receipt of support more accurately captures fluctuations over time in the father's propensity to make 
support payments. There is little substantive difference in results when using the two measures. 
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particularly low. Fewer than one father out of 27 regularly assists his children with home- 
work or attends school events. Over 75 percent of divorced fathers have never participated in 
the schooling of their children. Slightly more fathers (one out of 12) take their children on 
vacation, while a majority of fathers (three out of five) have purchased gifts. 
Because it is possible for fathers to provide only a subset of the types of assistance being 
considered, the data in Table 2 likely underestimate the percentage of fathers who have ever 
Table 2 * Percent of Fathers Making Different Numbers of Contributions 
Excluding Child Including Child 
Number of Different Support Payments Support Payments 
Contributions Made (percent) (percent) 
None 31 19 
One 10 16 
Two 12 10 
Three 11 11 
Four 9 10 
Five 6 8 
Six 6 6 
Seven 5 6 
Eight 11 8 
Nine 6 
provided any type of assistance. The data in Table 3 address this possibility by presenting the 
percentage of fathers who have ever provided different numbers of contributions. The first 
column of figures excludes child-support payments, while the second column of figures in- 
cludes them. More fathers have at some time provided at least one type of assistance than is 
evident from considering each type separately. Excluding child support, about two out of 
three fathers have made one or more types of contributions, while including child support, 
this figure increases to about four out of five fathers. Note, however, that these figures refer to 
having ever provided assistance-the percentage of fathers that provide assistance on a very 
regular basis would be much smaller. Moreover, the fact that one out of five fathers has never 
provided any of the types of assistance speaks to the frailty of father-child relationships outside 
of marriage. 
Explaining Fathers' Contributions 
Expected Relationships 
The multivariate analysis is designed to identify the key correlates of the provision of 
various forms of support and to ascertain whether fathers who provide a given form of assist- 
ance are more likely to make other contributions. The expected correlates of support are 
suggested by a framework developed by Weiss and Willis (1985). This framework, building on 
a microeconomic model of the family (Becker 1981), holds that both parents value their chil- 
dren and each therefore benefits from the other's investments in the children. In a two-par- 
ent family, propinquity generally acts to maximize the investments of both parents, so that 
either parent enjoys investments in a child, while also making such investments. After di- 
vorce, however, fathers lose control over the allocation of goods and services in the children's 
household and cannot assume that their economic contributions will be distributed as they 
wish between the private consumption of the mother and the children. 
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Table 3 * Beta Weights from Results of GLS Regression of Various Forms of Assistance on Predictor and Control Variables' 
Child Medical Medical School 
Variable Supportb Clothes Gifts Dentist Insurance Bills Vacations Homework Events 
Predictor Variables: 
Voluntary Agreement .403* .260* .193 .078 .394* .153 .312* .095 .108 
Spouse Relationship .041 .155* .144* .212* .082 .157* .149* .062* .083* 
No Visitation -.265 -.232 -.850* -.264 -.624* -.192 -.319 -.085 -.156 
Joint Custsody -.168 .979* .734* .690* .268 .893* .580* .787* .582* 
Child < 6 at Divorce .135 -.138 -.086 -.399* -.118 -.291 -.183 -.053 -.080 
Marital Duration .004 - .001 .001 .001 .004 - .001 .002 - .001 .001 
Divorce Duration -.003 
--.003 -.004* -.002 --.003 -.005* -.000 .000 -.000 
Proximity Medium -.072 .010 -.021 -.008 -.178 -.033 .261* -.128 -.166 
Proximity Low -.605* -.344* -.510* -.443* -.785* -.519* -.029 -.323* -.540* 
Control Variables: 
Black -.150 .126 -.454* -.264 -.146 -.220 .007 .008 -.108 
Father's Earnings .058* .024 .018 .038 .084* .051* .042* -.004 .018 
Mother's Earnings .003 -.008 -.002 .000 .004 -.005 .015 .003 .004 
Mother Some College .168 .046 .222 .103 .279 .134 .144 -.007 .008 
Mother College .172 .089 .148 .133 .077 .057 .418* .093 .218 
Number of Children -.089 -.056 .012 -.026 -.053 -.075 -.052 .039 .035 
Mother Remarried -.031 -.030 .008 .054 -.047 -.011 .088 -.031 .050 
Father Remarried .230* .061 .139 .024 .038 .022 .106 .042 -.036 
System weighted R2 = .102* 
Notes: 
a. Direction of coding for regularity of receipt of other forms of assistance is reversed from that shown in Table 1. 
b. Model for receipt of child support also includes controls for whether child support was awarded at divorce, the amount of child support awarded, 
whether the mother retained a lawyer and whether the divorce occurred in a state with a "no fault" provision. 
* p < .05. 
H 
z: 
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Within this framework, a divorced father is expected to contribute more to his children if 
he expects greater utility from making contributions than not. The level of utility is based on 
the costs and rewards associated with providing contributions. Thus, there is a close link 
between the notion of utility maximization within the microeconomic framework and sev- 
eral variants of exchange theory (Nye 1979). In this paper, the costs and rewards of providing 
contributions are assumed to be a function of two factors: (1) the degree of emotional and 
instrumental interdependency between the father and his children and (2) the quality of the 
relationship between the parents. 
Stronger interdependency between fathers and children increases utility by elevating sat- 
isfaction in fulfilling such interdependencies by providing different types of assistance. In 
turn, a good relationship between the divorced parents may increase utility by increasing 
interdependencies. It is also likely, though, that a better relationship between parents in- 
creases utility by increaseing the father's control over how his contributions are allocated. 
The strength of interdependency between fathers and their children is measured by the 
following variables: age of the children at divorce, whether visitation rights were granted, the 
father's physical proximity, and the time since the divorce. Age of the children at divorce is 
used to indicate the time fathers had with their children to make economic and emotional 
investments leading to interdependency. Both mothers and fathers are more likely to agree to 
visitation rights if the father-child interdependence is strong. Physical proximity, while indi- 
cating the opportunity to provide particular forms of assistance (e.g., help with homework), 
also measures the opportunity to maintain emotional and instrumental interdependency 
through contact. Time since divorce indicates the erosion of interdependency that occurs as 
fathers and children develop other interests and responsibilities. It is expected that fathers 
with older children at divorce, who have visitation rights, who live closer to their children, 
and who have been divorced for less time will be more likely to make contributions to their 
children. 
The nature of the relationship between parents is measured by the several variables: mar- 
ital duration, whether the divorce agreement was reached voluntarily, and the mother's re- 
port of the quality of the relationship (from bitter to friendly) between the parents during the 
divorce. Longer marriages, through greater economic and emotional investments, are likely 
to reflect stronger interdependency between mothers and fathers. The divorce settlement is 
more likely to be reached voluntarily when the parental relationship is of better quality. A 
more direct measure of the quality of the parental relationship, although limited to the time 
of divorce, is the mother's report of how friendly she was with the father during the divorce. 
It is therefore expected that fathers who were married longer, who entered into a voluntary 
divorce agreement and who enjoyed a better relationship with the mother during the divorce 
will be more likely to provide various forms of assistance to their children. 
The custody arrangement parents made for their children at divorce is also included in 
the analysis. Although still relatively rare, the prevalence of joint physical custody has been 
increasing (Seltzer 1991)-in the NLS sample about 10 percent of the mothers report that fa- 
thers have joint custody of their children. Joint custody is more likely to occur when the 
parents enjoy a reasonably good relationship and when fathers and children are more interde- 
pendent. As such, it is anticipated that fathers with joint custody will be more likely to make 
various contributions to their children. However, the nature of joint custody requires that its 
effect be evaluated somewhat differently from the effects of other variables. By the very na- 
ture of the custody arrangement, resources are provided to children simply by sharing house- 
holds so that the effect of joint custody on the degree to which fathers contribute to their 
children is likely inflated and must be interpreted cautiously. 
The multivariate analysis also contains a number of control variables that might mitigate 
the relationship among the covariates discussed above and the provision of various types of 
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assistance. These controls include: the socioeconomic resources of parents (measured at di- 
vorce), the current marital status of each parent, the number of children, and race.2 The 
socioeconomic resources of the parents are included in order to control for the overall ability 
of parents to provide for their children.3 The number of children is included to control for 
differences in level of household expenses faced by custodial mothers introduced by varia- 
tions in household composition. The remarriage of either parent is included to control for 
changes in interdependency that take place as allegiances are shifted to a new family and new 
boundaries are erected between the father and his children from the first marriage. Race is 
included as a control on the basis of research that indicates that black mothers (at least among 
women who are ever married) are less likely to receive child-support payments from the fa- 
ther (Beller and Graham 1985). 
Statistical Model 
The multivariate analysis is conducted using a simultaneous equation procedure in 
which each type of assistance is made jointly dependent and errors are allowed to be corre- 
lated across equations. This is sometimes known as a "seemingly unrelated equations model" 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981). The model is appropriate when the dependent variables are 
conceptually related. It is hypothesized that making child-support payments and providing 
other forms of assistance are interrelated. Consequently, it is expected that the error terms 
across the models for each type of assistance will be correlated. As indicated below, the ex- 
pected direction of the correlations across error terms will vary according to whether one 
hypothesizes that fathers use various forms of assistance as either supplements to or substi- 
tutes for each other. 
The model estimated takes the following general form: 
Y, = XL01 + El 
Yn = Xnin + En 
where Y1, ... .Y, are the forms of assistance provided by fathers, including child support, X , 
..., 
X are vectors of predictor variables that may overlap, 1 , 
.-..., 
in are vectors of parame- 
ters associated with the predictor variables and E1, ... En are error terms with Cov(Ei, Ej) not 
restricted to equal 0. The model is estimated using a two-step, generalized least squares proce- 
dure (PROC SYSLIN in SAS). 
The regularity with which child support and each of the eight other forms of assistance 
are provided constitute the dependent variables.4 The relationships between providing the 
2. Because the marital status of each parent is determined from responses provided by mothers, there is likely to be 
error in measuring whether the father has remarried. For the approximately 20 percent of mothers who stated that they 
did not know the marital status of the father, the cases are coded in the zero category (father not remarried). Similarly, 
when the father's location is not known, the proximity is coded as low. Preliminary analyses indicated that including 
separate indicators for whether the mother knew the location and marital status of the father does not lead to a better 
fitting model and does not affect the parameter estimates for other variables. 
More generally, there is missing data on several of the predictor variables included in the regression models. The 
procedure used to handle missing data was to code the mean value of the variable and include a set of dummy variables 
in preliminary models indicating whether a substitution was made. In none of the preliminary models did the missing 
data indicators lead to a substantially better fitting model or one that yielded substantively different results. 
3. There are two reasons for including the earnings of parents measured at the time of divorce. First, and most 
important, the NLS does not contain a measure of the father's income following divorce. Second, it is likely that varia- 
tions in earnings potential are reasonably well captured by earnings at divorce, especially given the relatively short 
period covered by the NLS data. The education of fathers is not included in the model because of its collinearity with his 
income and the education and income of mothers. 
4. The use of an ordinal scale to measure the regularity with which types of assistance are provided may lead to 
biased estimates of coefficients when GLS regression is used. However, least squares regression is generally robust to 
departures from normality. To obtain some idea of the robustness of the GLS results, a logistic regression model was 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 21 Jan 2015 13:52:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Contributions by Divorced Fathers 365 
various forms of support are indicated by the correlations between the error terms of the 
model. Positive correlations indicate that fathers who provide at least one type of support are 
also more likely to provide other types of assistance. Negative correlations indicate that fa- 
thers substitute types of support. 
Results 
The results from estimating the equations for fathers' contributions are presented in Table 
4.5 While there are some minor variations in effects across forms of assistance (some of which 
Table 4 * Cross-model Correlations for Dependent Variablesa 
Support Medical Medical School 
Variable Received Clothes Gifts Dentist Insurance Bills Vacations Homework Events 
Support 
Received 1.00 
Clothes .14 1.00 
Gifts .28 .58 1.00 
Dentist .20 .49 .42 1.00 
Medical 
Insurance .33 .35 .43 .56 1.00 
Medical 
Bills .25 .51 .37 .67 .52 1.00 
Vacations .24 .52 .52 .41 .35 .38 1.00 
Homework .03 .52 .36 .36 .28 .41 .39 1.00 
School 
Events .15 .52 .42 .37 .29 .39 .35 .66 1.00 
Note: 
a. All correlations except that between support received and homework are significant at p < .05. 
would be expected due to chance), the general pattern is clear. Consistent with the expecta- 
tions outlined above, fathers who enjoyed a friendlier relationship with the mother during 
the divorce (for all forms of assistance except child support and medical insurance) and who 
reached an agreement on the divorce settlement voluntarily (for child support, clothes, medi- 
cal insurance, and vacations) more regularly contribute to their children. The effect of propin- 
quity is particularly strong-fathers who live farthest from their children are the least likely 
to provide assistance (vacations being the one exception). Time since divorce is negatively 
related to the provision of gifts and the payment of medical bills. 
Also as expected, fathers who share joint custody of their children are more likely to 
provide assistance than fathers not sharing custody (medical insurance and child support be- 
ing exceptions), although the magnitude of the effects indicate that fathers with joint custody 
do not uniformly contribute to their children on a very regular basis. That joint custody does 
not affect the payment of child support is not unexpected given the sharing of costs that most 
fitted to each of the forms of assistance separately using 1 to indicate that the assistance had ever been received and 0 
otherwise. The results (not shown) correspond closely to those shown in Table 4. 
5. Several additional models were also estimated due to the possibility that the ambiguous time reference of sev- 
eral questions used in the NLS-72 introduces endogeneity (e.g., providing assistance influences the values taken by the 
covariates). Specifically, it is possible that endogeneity biases the effects of proximity of the father and the marital status 
of the parents. Using a stepwise procedure to enter these variables in various orders does not alter the pattern of results 
for other covariates. Possible endogeneity is not explicitly modeled, because this paper is less interested in partitioning 
the direction of causality and more interested in determining whether a relationship holds. Moreover, there is also 
concern for the change in the effects of other variables once the additional variables are included. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 21 Jan 2015 13:52:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
366 TEACHMAN 
likely occurs under this custody arrangement and the resulting latitude that parents have in 
structuring if and when one parent will make a monetary compensation to the other parent 
(Seltzer 1991). 
Neither the age of the children at divorce nor marital duration has a consistent effect on 
making contributions. While this may truly be the result of null effects, it should also be 
noted that the age of children and marital duration are highly collinear (which is exacerbated 
by the fact that a single cohort of young women is being examined). Indeed, the strength of 
the collinearity led to the use of a simple dichotomy for the age of children at divorce (at least 
one child less than age 6). However, other results (not shown) indicate that neither marital 
duration nor a continuous indicator of the age of children at divorce have significant effects 
when the other is left out of the model. 
Most of the control variables shown in Table 3 have only modest effects on the father's 
contributions. Higher income fathers are more likely to pay child support, carry medical in- 
surance, and pay for uninsured routine medical bills but are not more likely to provide other 
forms of assistance. Neither the economic and educational resources of the mother nor the 
number of children have a consistent effect on contributions from the father. The marital 
status of mothers and fathers has little effect on whether fathers provide assistance to their 
children except that remarried fathers are more likely to make child-support payments. 
The positive effect of the father's remarriage on the payment of child support is contrary 
to the expectation outlined earlier in the paper but is consistent with other reports (Beller and 
Graham 1985; Hill 1984). It may be that fathers who remarry are more family oriented than 
are fathers who do not remarry, leading to the positive impact on child-support payments. 
The failure of remarried fathers to provide other forms of assistance may be attributed to the 
demands on their time and resources made by their new families. 
The cross-model correlations for the equations, shown in Table 4, are all positive (and 
statistically significant with one exception), indicating that fathers who provide at least one 
form of assistance for their children are more likely to provide other forms of assistance. Note, 
however, that the correlations between paying child support and providing other contribu- 
tions are generally smaller than those observed between other pairs of support (the correla- 
tions between support received and both assisting with homework and attending school 
events are very small). On one hand, this suggests that a proportion of fathers restrict the 
transfer of resources to making child-support payments. On the other hand, these results indi- 
cate that if fathers contribute more than just child-support payments, they are likely to pro- 
vide several types of assistance. 
To examine both of these possibilities in greater detail, the extent to which fathers pro- 
vide more than one form of assistance to their children, conditional on having ever provided 
a given type of assistance, is shown in Table 5. The mean number of other forms of support 
ever provided is indicated according to whether each type of assistance has at one time been 
provided. For most forms of assistance, fathers who have at one time provided the assistance 
in question have provided between five to six other types of assistance (including the type of 
support being considered). Of particular note is the number of other types of support provided 
by fathers who help their children with homework or attend school events. Although these 
forms of assistance are relatively rare (see Table 1), the fathers that do provide this sort of 
support make a substantial number of other contributions. 
At another extreme, a few other forms of assistance are provided by fathers who have 
ever paid child support (3.31). This value is much smaller than comparable figures for other 
forms of assistance and occurs because a substantial proportion of fathers, about 20 percent 
(data not shown), make child-support payments but do not provide other types of assistance. 
That is, the mean number of other forms of assistance provided by fathers who make child- 
support payments is weighted downward by the proportion of fathers who make child-sup- 
port payments but provide no other contributions to their children. 
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Table 5 * Mean Number of Other Forms of Assistance Ever Provided by Fathers According to 
Whether Each Type of Assistance Has Ever Been Provided 
Mean number of other forms of assistance 
Variable Ever Provided Never Provided 
Child-Support Payments 3.31 1.35 
Clothes 5.54 1.20 
Gifts 4.41 0.35 
Dentist 6.30 1.44 
Medical Insurance 5.23 1.15 
Medical Bills 6.32 1.50 
Vacation 5.41 1.30 
Homework 6.87 1.88 
School Events 6.10 1.54 
Mean number of forms of assistance provided: 2.86 
Note: All differences between value for ever provided and never provided are significant at p < .05. 
Table 6 * Results of OLS Regression of Number of Contributions made by Fathers on Predictor 
Variables and Controls 
Excluding Child Including Child 
Variable Support Payments Support Payments 
Predictor Variables: Beta Beta 
Voluntary Agreement .731* .877* 
Spouse Relationship .260* .273* 
No Visitation 
--.902* - 1.188* 
Joint Custody 1.133* .929* 
Child < 6 at Divorce -.251 -.190 
Marital Duration .006 .006 
Divorce Duration -.004 -.004 
Proximity Medium -.498* -.498* 
Proximity Low - 1.644* - 1.862* 
Control Variables: 
Black -.167 -.288 
Father's Earnings .089* .108* 
Mother's Earnings 
--.019 -.018 
Mother Some College .224 .297 
Number of Children -.256 -.278 
Mother College .469 .507 
Mother Remarried -.223 -.239 
Father Remarried .204 .291 
R2 .23* .25* 
Notes: 
a. Direction of coding for regularity of receipt of other forms of assistance is reversed from that shown in Table 1. 
* p < .05. 
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The multivariate analysis is concluded by considering the predictors of the number of 
different contributions ever made by fathers. Because the cross-model correlations shown in 
Table 4 and the means shown in Table 5 indicate that fathers who provide at least one type of 
assistance are more likely to provide other contributions, it is expected that the predictors of 
the number of contributions ever made will be similar to those for the regularity with which 
individual types of assistance are provided. As shown in Table 6, the pattern of effects for the 
number of different contributions made by fathers is indeed very similar to that observed in 
Table 3. Fathers who voluntarily agreed to the divorce settlement, who enjoyed a friendlier 
relationship with their spouse during the divorce, who live closer to their children, who earn 
more, who have visitation rights and who have joint custody all provide a greater number of 
contributions. Thus, the factors that lead fathers to make at least one type of contribution 
more regularly also act to increase the diversity of the types of contributions they provide to 
their children. 
Discussion 
Using data from a nationally representative sample, I have examined the extent to which 
divorced fathers contribute to their children, ranging from clothes to help with homework. 
Other than paying child support and buying gifts, the majority of fathers have never provided 
assistance to their children. Consistent with other studies which show that divorced fathers 
have little contact with their children (Furstenberg et al. 1983), fathers are particularly un- 
likely to provide assistance that requires their direct participation (e.g., helping their children 
with homework or attending school events). 
The picture is less dramatic but still telling when considering the percent of fathers who 
have at one time provided at least one type of assistance. Other than paying child support, 
about one out of three fathers has never provided assistance to their children. Considering 
both child-support payments and other forms of assistance, about one out of five fathers has 
never provided any form of assistance. While these figures show that a majority of fathers 
have provided at least some form of assistance to their children, they also indicate that a 
substantial minority have never contributed to their children (at least with respect to the 
forms of assistance considered in this paper). Moreover, the figures refer to having ever pro- 
vided assistance, ignoring the regularity with which contributions are made. For example, 
none of the fathers in the NLS sample has provided each of the types of support on a very 
regular basis (data not shown). Including child-support payments, only 50 percent of the fa- 
thers have provided at least one type of assistance on a very regular basis (data not shown). 
One consequence of this pattern is that children from disrupted families are more likely 
to experience some form of deprivation than children from intact families. Subsequent re- 
search needs to more clearly document the parameters of this deprivation, its long term conse- 
quences, and the role of various types of contributions from fathers in alleviating deprivation. 
It would also be useful to obtain a better understanding of the socioemotional consequences 
for children of variations in the nature and extent of contributions made by fathers. 
While not the central focus of this paper, the effect of joint custody on the provision of 
assistance is also interesting to note. With the exception of paying child support, it is clear that 
fathers who share physical custody of their children are more likely to transfer resources to 
their children. Although this may occur because joint physical custody increases the partici- 
pation of fathers in rearing their children, such a conclusion must be made with a significant 
caveat. Under the current regime of divorce settlements, parents who agree to a joint custody 
arrangement are likely to be an unusually select subset of all parents (as noted above, in the 
NLS data, joint custody arrangements characterize only about 10 percent of the divorces). 
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Attempts to unilaterally increase the prevalence of joint physical custody could result in rap- 
idly diminishing returns in terms of the father's contribution. It remains an open question as 
to the nature and extent of this selectivity problem--but a question that is crucial for the 
development of policy initiatives. 
Despite the generally negative tone of the findings, the data indicate that there is a subset 
of fathers who contribute substantially to their children. Both the cross-tabular and mul- 
tivariate analyses indicate that fathers who regularly make child-support payments supple- 
ment those payments with other forms of assistance. There is no evidence to indicate that 
various forms of assistance may serve as substitutes for each other. 
Finally, the multivariate analysis indicates that objective measures of household socioeco- 
nomic status (i.e., mother's education and income, fathers income, number and ages of chil- 
dren) are less important in predicting whether assistance is provided than are indicators of the 
parental relationship. The development of policy and programs aimed at maximizing the 
contributions to the children of divorce should consider the role played by the parental 
relationship. 
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Appendix A * Means and Standard Deviations for Independent Variables 
Predictor Variables Values Mean SD 
Voluntary Agreement 1 = Child-support agreement reached voluntarily 
0 = Otherwise .54 .50 
Visitation 1 = Visitation rights not granted at divorce 
0 = Otherwise .07 .26 
Child < 6 at Divorcea 1 = At least one child < 6 at divorce 
0 = Otherwise .78 .42 
Number of Children Number of own children at divorce 1.50 .70 
Duration of Marriage In months 70.67 37.74 
Duration since Divorce In months 78.57 46.19 
Log of Mother's Income Log of income at divorce in 1985 dollars 6.94 4.10 
Mother Collegeb 1 = College degree or higher 
0 = Otherwise .08 .27 
Mother Some Collegeb 1 = At least some college 
0 = Otherwise .34 .47 
Log of Father's Income Log of income at divorce in 1985 dollars 9.17 2.62 
Joint Custody 1 = Joint physical custody 
0 = Otherwise .10 .30 
Spouse Relationship 1 = Bitter 
During Divorce 2 = Many disputes 
3 = Some disputes 
4 = Friendly 2.64 1.09 
Black 1 = Black 
0 = Otherwise .14 .35 
Regularity of Support 1 = Never 
2 = Seldom 
3 = Occasionally 
4 = Regularly 2.31 1.28 
Proximity Mediumc 1 = Same state or different state < 500 miles 
0 = Otherwise .38 .49 
Proximity Lowc 1 = Different state > 500 miles or don't know 
0 = Otherwise .28 .45 
Mother Remarried 1 = Mother has remarried 
0 = Otherwise .48 .50 
Father Remarried 1 = Father has remarried 
0 = Otherwise .53 .50 
Notes: The following variables were used in the equation for making child support payments but not in the equations for 
the receipt of other forms of support. Mother Retained a Lawyer at Divorce (1 = No, 0 = Otherwise; mean = .11, sd = 
.31); Divorce Occurred in "No Fault State" (1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise; mean = .71, sd = .46); Child Support was Awarded 
at Divorce (1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise; mean = .81, sd = .39); Log of Amount of Child Support Awarded at Divorce (In log 
of 1985 dollars; mean = 4.33, sd = 2.29). 
a. Age of children at divorce is dichotomized because of the high degree of collinearity with marital duration. Age 6 
was used as the age for dichotomization because this is the age at which children begin attending school. 
b. Mother's education at divorce was reported in categories. Dummy variable coding is used to capture potential non- 
linearities in the effect of education. 
c. Father's location was reported in categories that only allow dummy variable coding. 
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